Cryptographic backdoors are a mechanism whereby one can alter a specific algorithm, providing the perpetrator with a means to break the resulting cipher in significantly less time than would normally be required. Such mechanisms can be created within a variety of cryptographic algorithms, including pseudo-random number generators.

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